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ALL GOOD THINGS MIGHT COME TO AN
 
END: POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
 
IN CONNECTICUT
 
BERNARDO G. CUADRA* 
INTRODUCTION 
Postnuptial agreements1 made headlines in late 2010 when a 
Los Angeles County judge ruled that the postnuptial agreement be­
tween Frank McCourt and his wife, Jamie McCourt, was invalid and 
thus did not control their property division at divorce.2  Frank and 
Jamie, who had initiated divorce proceedings in California in 2009, 
vehemently disputed ownership over the Los Angeles Dodgers, the 
franchise Frank had purchased for $421 million in 2004.3  At the 
center of that dispute was a postnuptial agreement, multiple copies 
of which the couple had signed in Massachusetts and California in 
2004.4  Incredibly, the copies signed in California were substantively 
* J.D., Western New England University School of Law. Bernardo is an Associ­
ate at Shipman & Goodwin LLP and currently practices in the area of Trusts and Es­
tates.  Prior to joining Shipman & Goodwin, Bernardo clerked for the Honorable 
Flemming L. Norcott, Jr. of the Connecticut Supreme Court. 
1. A postnuptial agreement is “[a]n agreement entered into during marriage to 
define each spouse’s property rights in the event of death or divorce. The term com­
monly refers to an agreement between spouses during the marriage at a time when 
separation or divorce is not imminent.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1286 (9th ed. 2009). 
Postnuptial agreements are sometimes referred to as “marital agreements;” see PRINCI­
PLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.01 
(1)(b) (2002); and “mid-marriage agreements;” see Pacelli v. Pacelli, 725 A.2d 56, 57-58 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). 
A particular subset of postnuptial agreements are “reconciliation agreements,” 
which are “contract[s] between spouses who have had marital difficulties but who now 
wish to save the marital relationship, [usually] by specifying certain economic actions 
that might ameliorate pressures on the marriage.” BLACK’S  LAW  DICTIONARY 1387 
(9th ed. 2009); see, e.g., Hanner v. Hanner, 388 P.2d 239, 241 (Ariz. 1964) (“The law 
encourages the resumption of marital relations.  Since the purpose of a reconciliation 
agreement is to restore marital relations, it harmonizes with public policy and will be 
upheld.”). 
2. McCourt v. McCourt, No. BD514309, 2010 WL 5092780, slip op. at 4-5 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2010); Greg Risling, Associated Press, McCourt Marital Pact on 
Dodgers Ruled Invalid (Dec. 7, 2010), available at http://www.boston.com/sports/ 
other_sports/articles/ 2010/12/07/spokesman_mccourt_deal_on_dodgers_invalid/. 
3. McCourt, 2010 WL 5092780, slip op. at 15. 
4. Id. at 1, 7, 12. 
57 
31827-w
ne_34-1 S
heet N
o. 33 S
ide B
      05/09/2012   13:22:53
31827-wne_34-1 Sheet No. 33 Side B      05/09/2012   13:22:53
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-1\WNE102.txt unknown Seq: 2  9-MAY-12 10:25
R
 
58 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:57 
different from those signed in Massachusetts; the Massachusetts 
copies contained an attachment that included the Los Angeles 
Dodgers and other significant assets as Frank’s separate property, 
while the California copies expressly excluded those assets from 
Frank’s separate property.5 
The judge’s ruling, in addition to accelerating the Los Angeles 
Dodgers’ financial turmoil,6 directed attention to the existence of 
postnuptial agreements and the procedures attendant to their draft­
ing and execution.  Although the judge decided the case based in 
part on the absence of mutual assent,7 the McCourts’ postnuptial 
agreement was doomed at the outset. First, both husband and wife 
were represented by the same lawyer.8  Second, the parties had 
signed two substantively different versions of the agreement.9  Fi­
nally, the McCourts expressly acknowledged that they had not care­
fully read the agreements, if at all.10 
The McCourts’ marital dispute is, of course, unusual because it 
involved the ownership of a Major League Baseball team.  But dis­
putes over the validity or enforceability of a postnuptial agreement 
are not unique.  Although a relatively recent creature,11 postnuptial 
agreements have received increased media attention as of late,12 
and many states have conclusively declared them to be valid, albeit 
with varying restrictions.13 
Recently, in Bedrick v. Bedrick, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court addressed for the first time the validity and enforceability of 
5. Id. at 7-8. 
6. See Bill Shaikin, In Filing for Bankruptcy, Dodgers Will Ask Judge to Override 
MLB Rules, L.A. TIMES (June 27, 2011), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/ 
jun/27/sports/ la-sp-dodgers-bankruptcy-20110628. 
7. McCourt, 2010 WL 5092780, slip op. at 67. 
8. Id. at 10. 
9. Id. at 13-14. 
10. Id. at 12, 62. 
11. Sean Hannon Williams, Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 827, 829; 
Linda Ravdin, Marital Agreements, Tax Management (BNA) No. 849, § I(G), at A-3 
(2003) (“Postmarital agreements not incident to marital separation are of more recent 
vintage.”). 
12. See, e.g., Robert DiGiacomo, Quit Fighting—Get a Postnuptial Agreement, 
CNN.COM (Apr. 2, 2008), http://articles.cnn.com/2008-04-02/living/postnuptial.agree-
ment_1_prenuptial-postnuptial-agreements-inheritance-money?_s=PM:LIVING; Susan 
Pease Gadoua, The Legal Alternative Every Couple Should Know About Before Going 
to Divorce Court, HUFFINGTON  POST (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
susan-pease-gadoua/the-legal-alternative-eve_b_948865.html. 
13. Williams, supra note 11, at 881. 
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postnuptial agreements.14  The court concluded that postnuptial 
agreements are consistent with public policy and thus enforceable if 
a particular agreement “complies with applicable contract princi­
ples, and the terms of the agreement are both fair and equitable at 
the time of execution and not unconscionable at the time of dissolu­
tion.”15  Although the opinion sets forth substantial guidance for 
practitioners seeking to draft valid postnuptial agreements, at least 
three important questions remain: (1) does the promise to forgo 
divorce and remain married serve as adequate consideration for the 
agreement; (2) what does the unconscionability test actually re­
quire; and (3) who carries the burden of proof, the proponent of or 
the challenger to the agreement? 
This Article identifies and analyzes this open space left by 
Bedrick.  Part I briefly reviews the state of the law governing pre­
nuptial agreements in Connecticut and the factual background to 
Bedrick.  Part II examines the Bedrick standard for reviewing post­
nuptial agreements and highlights the areas where the Bedrick 
court may have fallen short.  Part III reviews relevant law from 
Connecticut and other jurisdictions and proposes potential solu­
tions to the questions left unresolved by Bedrick. 
I. THE BEDRICK BACKDROP 
Bedrick v. Bedrick came to the Connecticut Supreme Court on 
the husband’s appeal from the trial court’s judgment declaring the 
postnuptial agreement invalid.16  On appeal, the husband, relying 
on Connecticut case law addressing prenuptial agreements, argued, 
inter alia, that the trial court improperly declined to apply princi­
ples of contract law in evaluating the enforceability of the parties’ 
postnuptial agreement.17  This Part accordingly reviews the relevant 
law on prenuptial agreements and then sets forth the factual basis 
for the husband’s appeal. 
A. Standards for Prenuptial Agreements in Connecticut 
Connecticut has two different standards for determining the 
enforceability of prenuptial agreements.  The date of the execution 
14. Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 21 (Conn. 2011).  In 2010, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court also addressed postnuptial agreements for the first time and 
upheld their validity.  Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 929 N.E.2d 955, 961 (Mass. 2010). 
15. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 24, 27. 
16. Id. at 22. 
17. Id. at 23. 
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60 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:57 
of the agreement determines which standard applies.  Agreements 
signed before October 1, 1995, must comply with the standard set 
forth in McHugh v. McHugh.18  In McHugh, the Connecticut Su­
preme Court stated that a prenuptial agreement is enforceable if 
(1) the contract was validly entered into; (2) its terms do not vio­
late statute or public policy; and (3) the circumstances of the par­
ties at the time the marriage is dissolved are not so beyond the 
contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was entered 
into as to cause its enforcement to work injustice.19 
McHugh specified that a prenuptial agreement’s validity at execu­
tion is governed by ordinary principles of contract law, and thus, 
each party must knowingly and voluntarily enter into the agree­
ment and, absent independent knowledge by the other party, fully 
disclose all assets.20  Some ambiguity existed, however, regarding 
who carried the burden of proof21 and what standard of review ap­
plied to the contract terms at the time of execution, if any.22 
The Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act (Premarital 
Agreement Act), enacted in 1995, cleared up this ambiguity. For 
prenuptial agreements executed on or after October 1, 1995, the 
Premarital Agreement Act governs enforceability.23  That statute 
principally provides that a prenuptial agreement is enforceable only 
if it was entered into voluntarily, it was not unconscionable at the 
time of execution or enforcement, and both parties provided full 
18. Id. at 25. 
19. McHugh v. McHugh, 436 A.2d 8, 11 (Conn. 1980). 
20. Id. at 11.  The court also noted other factors to be considered, including 
“which party drafted the agreement . . . and whether the parties were represented by 
counsel.” Id. at 12.  Although the court did not directly address consideration, quoting 
Sacksell v. Barrett, the court stated that “there appears to be no good reason why such 
an agreement, if fairly made and entered into, by a [person] of full age, for adequate 
consideration received, should not be binding upon [him].” Id. (quoting Sacksell v. 
Barrett, 43 A.2d 79, 81 (1945)) (alteration in original). 
21. The confusion over the burden of proof permeated the lower courts. Com­
pare Lord v. Lord, No. 10 11 97, 1995 WL 17356, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 1995) 
(noting “the proponent of the enforceability of the antenuptial agreement . . . bears the 
burden of proof on the issue”), with Baumgartner v. Baumgartner, No. FA 960155390S, 
1998 WL 811565, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 1998) (noting that the challenger did 
not meet her burden of proof for establishing inadequate disclosure, duress, or undue 
influence).  The Connecticut Appellate and Supreme Courts later confirmed that the 
challenger carries this burden in Winchester v. McCue, 882 A.2d 143, 149 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 2005) and Crews v. Crews, 989 A.2d 1060, 1069 (Conn. 2010), respectively. See also 
Louis Parley, Premarital Agreements in Connecticut Where We Are and Where We Are 
Going, 69 CONN. B.J. 495, 505 (1995). 
22. See Parley, supra note 21, at 507. 
23. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-36a to -36j (2011). 
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61 2012] POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS IN CONNECTICUT 
financial disclosure and had a reasonable opportunity to consult 
with independent counsel prior to signing.24  Significantly, the 
spouse who challenges enforcement of the agreement bears the 
burden of establishing that the agreement is invalid.25  In addition, 
consideration is not a requirement for enforcement.26 
In contrast to Connecticut’s established body of law on pre­
nuptial agreements, there had not been any law governing the en­
forceability of postnuptial agreements before the Connecticut 
Supreme Court decided Bedrick.  Connecticut Superior Courts at­
tempted to fill this void by turning to analogous statutory law, con­
tract law, and principles of fairness.27  In 2011, however, Bedrick 
presented this question of first impression for the Connecticut Su­
preme Court to resolve. 
B. Background on Bedrick 
Bruce and Deborah Bedrick married in 197628 and subse­
quently executed a postnuptial agreement on December 10, 1977.29 
During the early years of their marriage, the Bedricks updated their 
postnuptial agreement five times, executing the latest addendum in 
May of 1989.30  In relevant part, the postnuptial agreement and its 
addendums provided that, upon dissolution of the marriage: (1) 
both parties waived any claim to alimony or to any part of the other 
spouse’s estate; (2) Bruce released Deborah from liability for out­
standing business loans on his car wash business; and (3) Bruce 
would pay Deborah a cash settlement of $75,000.31 
The personal and financial circumstances of the Bedricks were 
not extraordinary.  The Bedricks married at age twenty-five, neither 
with a college degree.32  At the time that they married, the Bedricks 
24. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36g.  Notably, the requirement of an opportunity to 
consult with independent counsel departs from McHugh’s inclusion of that opportunity 
as a factor to consider. McHugh, 436 A.2d at 11; see Parley, supra note 21, at 505, 509. 
Contra Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 28 n.6 (Conn. 2011) (stating that “opportunity to 
confer with independent [legal] counsel” should be considered when courts evaluate 
whether agreement was fair and reasonable at execution). 
25. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36g(a). 
26. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36c. 
27. Bedrick v. Bedrick, No. FA074007533, 2009 WL 1335100, at *2 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Apr. 24, 2009). 
28. Bedrick, 2009 WL 1335100, at *3. 
29. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 22.  The Bedricks’ postnuptial agreement is reproduced in 
the appendix to this article. See infra Appendix. 
30. Id. 
31. Id.; Bedrick, 2009 WL 1335100, at *3. 
32. Bedrick, 2009 WL 1335100, at *3. 
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worked at Mr. Auto Wash, the Bedrick family car wash business.33 
In 1986, after ten years of marriage, Bruce purchased the family 
business from his parents for $320,000 and, in 1994, he purchased 
the real estate upon which it was located for $280,000.34  The 
Bedricks both worked in the family car wash business throughout 
their marriage.35  Their only son was born in 1991.36 
In 2007, after thirty-two years of marriage, Deborah filed for 
dissolution, and Bruce subsequently filed a cross-complaint to en­
force their postnuptial agreement.37  At that time, the parties’ com­
bined marital assets totaled $927,123.0038  After trial, the trial court 
concluded that the postnuptial agreement was neither fair and equi­
table nor supported by adequate consideration, and further, that 
the parties’ financial circumstances “had changed dramatically since 
. . . 1989.”39  Accordingly, the trial court declined to enforce the 
postnuptial agreement.40 
II. THE BEDRICK STANDARD 
In Bedrick v. Bedrick, the Connecticut Supreme Court out­
lined the standard to be applied when determining whether a post­
nuptial agreement is enforceable.41  In doing so, the court explicitly 
stated that a stricter standard of review was required than that ap­
plied to prenuptial agreements, based on the nature of the relation­
ship between spouses.42  The court concluded that, although 
postnuptial agreements were consistent with public policy and thus 
valid in Connecticut, the parties’ agreement ultimately was not en­
forceable because its terms were unconscionable at the time of 
dissolution.43 
In reaching its decision, the court articulated the following 
standard for enforceability of postnuptial agreements: “In applying 
special scrutiny, a court may enforce a postnuptial agreement only 
if it complies with applicable contract principles, and the terms of 
the agreement are both fair and equitable at the time of execution 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at *4. 
37. Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 21-22 (Conn. 2011). 
38. Id. at 22. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 27-28. 
42. Id. at 27. 
43. Id. at 24, 29. 
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and not unconscionable at the time of dissolution.”44  Although the 
court specifically stated that this standard called for greater scru­
tiny, it did not explain what exactly it meant by “stricter scrutiny.”45 
This Part reviews the Bedrick test and identifies its potential 
shortcomings. 
A. Contract Principles 
The court first briefly noted that contract principles would ap­
ply to postnuptial agreements.46  In a footnote, however, the court 
made clear that, in contrast to prenuptial agreements, postnuptial 
agreements do require adequate consideration to be enforceable.47 
Further, the court stated that “[a] release by one spouse of his or 
her interest in the estate of the other spouse, in exchange for a simi­
lar release by the other spouse, may constitute adequate considera­
tion.”48  Significantly, the court determined that, in the case of the 
Bedricks, adequate consideration was furnished in the form of mu­
tual releases and waivers: the wife had waived her right to alimony 
and any interest in the husband’s assets, including the car wash bus­
iness, and, in return, the husband had waived his right to alimony 
and any interest in the wife’s assets and also had released the wife 
from any liability relative to the husband’s business.49 
Notwithstanding the court’s clear pronouncement that consid­
eration is a requirement for postnuptial agreements, Bedrick left 
for another day the issue of whether a spouse’s promise to remain 
married—i.e., the promise not to divorce—may be sufficient con­
sideration for a postnuptial agreement.50  “Consideration consists 
of a benefit to the party promising, or a loss or detriment to the 
party to whom the promise is made,”51 and may take the form of 
“forbearance from action that [a] party would otherwise have been 
44. Id. at 27. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 27 n.5.  Interestingly, a premarital agreement later amended after mar­
riage does not require consideration. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36f (2011). 
48. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 27 n.5. 
49. Id. 
50. Id.  The court understandably avoided the issue because the defendant did 
not press it. Id.; see also Sequenzia v. Guerrieri Masonry Inc., 9 A.3d 322, 324 (Conn. 
2010) (noting that appellate courts should not decide issues not properly before it).  In 
any event, the court did not address “whether a spouse’s forbearance from bringing a 
claimed dissolution action and the continuation of the marriage provides adequate con­
sideration for a postnuptial agreement.” Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 27 n.5. 
51. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 27 n.5. 
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64 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:57 
entitled to take.”52  Thus, a party who forbears from filing for di­
vorce has given up a right to which he was entitled.  Courts, how­
ever, have come out both ways on the issue of whether such 
forbearance serves as adequate consideration to support a postnup­
tial agreement.53  Although Bedrick does not state where Connecti­
cut may fall, the court’s increased scrutiny of postnuptial 
agreements suggests that something more than the promise not to 
divorce will be required to support the agreement. 
B. Fair and Equitable at Execution 
The court spent considerably more time discussing the require­
ment that a postnuptial agreement’s terms be fair and equitable at 
the time of execution.  The court initially focused on the procedural 
requirements at the time of execution: 
We further hold that the terms of a postnuptial agreement are 
fair and equitable at the time of execution if the agreement is 
made voluntarily, and without any undue influence, fraud, coer­
cion, duress or similar defect.  Moreover, each spouse must be 
given full, fair and reasonable disclosure of the amount, character 
and value of property, both jointly and separately held, and all of 
the financial obligations and income of the other spouse.54 
The court then set forth a totality of the circumstances analysis that 
takes into consideration several “factors, including the nature and 
complexity of the agreement’s terms, the extent of and disparity in 
assets brought to the marriage by each spouse, . . . traits potentially 
affecting the ability [of the parties] to read and understand an 
agreement’s provisions, and the” time available to each party to re­
view the agreement’s terms and consult with independent counsel.55 
These considerations are identical to those embodied in the Pre­
marital Agreement Act, which provides in part that a premarital 
agreement is enforceable if it was executed voluntarily and if the 
opponent to the agreement was “provided a fair and reasonable dis­
closure of the amount, character and value of property, financial 
obligations and income of the other party.”56 
52. Ravdin, supra note 11, at A-41 n.515. 
53. Compare In re Marriage of Tabassum & Younis, 881 N.E.2d 396, 407 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2007) (forbearance from bringing divorce is adequate consideration), with 
Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 603 (Tenn. 2006) (holding that a “promise not to 
leave [your spouse] is clearly not consideration for the agreement”). 
54. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 27. 
55. Id. at 28 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
56. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36g(a)(1) & (3) (2011). 
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Although the second Bedrick prong bears substantial similari­
ties with the Premarital Agreement Act, several differences warrant 
attention.  First, consistent with the court’s statement that postnup­
tial agreements require heightened scrutiny, the court imposed a 
more rigorous “fair and reasonable” standard on the postnuptial 
agreement’s terms at the time of execution.57  This fair and reasona­
ble standard sets a higher threshold for enforceability than the un­
conscionability standard because it is easier for the challenger to 
establish that an agreement was not fair and reasonable at the time 
of execution than it is to prove that it was unconscionable at that 
time.58  Indeed, the court recognized this distinction by noting that 
“[u]nfairness or inequality alone does not render a postnuptial 
agreement unconscionable.”59  Thus, the court’s imposition of this 
standard ultimately decreases the overall likelihood that a postnup­
tial agreement will be enforced.60 
Second, the court did not indicate whether the opponent car­
ries the burden of establishing that the terms of the agreement were 
fair and reasonable at the time of execution, as is statutorily re­
quired for premarital agreements in Connecticut,61 or whether the 
proponent would carry that burden.  Although the court’s imposi­
tion of heightened scrutiny for postnuptial agreements suggests that 
the proponent carries the burden, both parties to the agreement 
should anticipate the possibility of future litigation. 
57. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 27. 
58. See Upham v. Upham, 630 N.E.2d 307, 311 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (“Although 
there may be substantial overlap between the [conscionability and fair and reasonable] 
standards, a standard of conscionability generally ‘requires a greater showing of inap­
propriateness.’” (quoting 3 ALEXANDER  LINDEY & LOUIS I. PARLEY, SEPARATION 
AGREEMENTS AND  ANTENUPTIAL  CONTRACTS § 90.07 (2d ed. 2011))); Lounsbury v. 
Lounsbury, 752 N.Y.S.2d 103, 107 (App. Div. 2002) (“[A] separation agreement is not 
per se unconscionable simply because marital assets are divided unequally . . . , because 
one spouse gave away more than [that spouse] might have been legally required to do 
. . . , or because the spouse’s decision to approve the agreement might be characterized 
as unwise.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in origi­
nal)); 2 ALEXANDER LINDEY & LOUIS I. PARLEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND AN­
TENUPTIAL  CONTRACTS § 120.55[2] (2d ed. 2011) (“[Unconscionability] is a higher 
standard for the assailant to overcome . . . .”  (emphasis added)). 
59. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 28. 
60. See David M. Cotter, Substantive Sufficiency of Marital Agreements: Uncon­
scionability and Unfairness, 17 DIVORCE LITIG. 173, 180 (Nov. 2005) (“[I]t is generally 
more difficult to set aside a marital agreement on the ground of unconscionability.”). 
61. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36g(a) (placing burden on “the party against whom 
enforcement is sought”). 
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Finally, the court did not require that each party have a reason­
able opportunity to consult with counsel.62  Instead, the court 
merely stated that courts, “in evaluating the circumstances sur­
rounding a particular agreement, . . . should examine . . . whether 
[the parties] had a reasonable opportunity to confer with indepen­
dent counsel.”63  By delegating this question to the totality-of-the­
circumstances analysis, the court effectively lowered the threshold 
for establishing the validity of the postnuptial agreement; recall that 
the opportunity to consult with counsel is a statutory requirement 
for applicable prenuptial agreements.64  Here, the court departed 
from its mandate to increase judicial scrutiny applied to postnuptial 
agreements.  Indeed, at least one jurisdiction—Minnesota—simi­
larly seeking to increase scrutiny on postnuptial agreements has leg­
islatively taken the opposite approach of the Bedrick court by 
mandating that each party to a prenuptial agreement have the op­
portunity to meet with legal counsel while requiring that parties to 
a postnuptial agreement each have separate counsel at the time of 
execution.65  Notwithstanding the ambiguity present in Bedrick, 
lawyers should remain vigilant and ensure that the opposing party is 
represented by counsel.66 
C. Not Unconscionable at Enforcement 
Finally, the court reviewed the unconscionability prong, upon 
which it decided the case.  The court first indicated that a postnup­
tial agreement that produces an unfair or unequal result does not 
reach the threshold of unconscionability: “Instead, the question of 
whether enforcement of an agreement would be unconscionable is 
analogous to determining whether enforcement of an agreement 
would work an injustice.”67  Here, the court drew an important con­
nection to Connecticut jurisprudence on the enforceability of pre­
62. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 28 n.6. 
63. Id. 
64. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36g(a)(4); see Friezo v. Friezo, 914 A.2d 533, 557 
(Conn. 2007). 
65. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 519.11 (1), (1a) (West Supp. 2011). 
66. Jurisdictions come out differently on the requirement of representation or the 
reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel. Compare Stoner v. Stoner, 819 A.2d 529, 
532, 533 n.5 (Pa. 2003) (“[D]eclin[ing] to impose a per se requirement that parties had 
to obtain independent legal counsel . . . .”), and Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 929 N.E.2d 955, 
963 (Mass. 2010) (judge should consider if the parties “had an opportunity to obtain 
separate legal counsel of [their] own choosing . . .”), with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 519.11 
(1a)(c) (independent counsel required for each party). 
67. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 28. 
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67 2012] POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS IN CONNECTICUT 
nuptial agreements, a body of law that should be helpful in 
evaluating postnuptial agreements.  The court also noted that the 
occurrence of unforeseen events, “such as having a child, loss of 
employment or moving to another state . . .” could render the en­
forcement of a postnuptial agreement unconscionable.68  The court 
ultimately concluded that the Bedricks’ postnuptial agreement was 
invalid because it was unconscionable.  Specifically, the court fo­
cused on the changed financial picture of the husband’s car wash 
business and upheld the trial court’s determination “that enforce­
ment of the postnuptial agreement would have worked [an] 
injustice.”69 
Although the court’s conclusion is a useful starting point, its 
guidance is incomplete.70  First, the court did not explain the uncon­
scionability standard in the context of postnuptial agreements; it 
merely asked whether enforcement of the postnuptial agreement 
would work an injustice.71  The court then passed on the opportu­
nity to establish a workable test by applying that standard to the 
facts in Bedrick.  Although the court reviewed the basic provisions 
of the postnuptial agreement, as well as the Bedricks’ employment 
history and then-current financial circumstances, it did not examine 
the intent of the parties at the time that they signed the agreement 
or whether the circumstances at dissolution were consistent with 
the parties’ expectations.72  In other words, the court did not deter­
mine whether the parties had contemplated their eventual financial 
or familial positions.  Instead, the court disregarded any guidance it 
could have taken from Crews and sidestepped the examination of 
foreseeability.  The result was the court’s conclusion that “[t]he 
facts and circumstances of the present case clearly support the find­
ings of the trial court that, as a matter of law, enforcement of the 
agreement would be unconscionable.”73  At the very least, such a 
dismissive conclusion is unfair to the litigants and potentially incon­
sistent with the court’s own guidance in Crews. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
70. Again, the court did not identify which party bears the burden of establishing 
the unconscionability of the agreement. 
71. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 28. 
72. Id. at 29. This “mixed question[ ] of fact and law, which require[d] the appli­
cation of a legal standard to the historical-fact determinations, . . . [called for] plenary 
review by [the] court unfettered by the clearly erroneous standard . . . .”  Crews v. 
Crews, 989 A.2d 1060, 1066 (Conn. 2010) (quoting Friezo v. Friezo, 914 A.2d 533, 544 
(Conn. 2007)). 
73. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 29. 
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68 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:57 
Moreover, the court’s suggestion that the birth of a child dur­
ing marriage may be an unforeseeable circumstance is indepen­
dently puzzling.74  Certainly, if a married couple had taken steps to 
prevent a pregnancy, or were so far beyond the age when preg­
nancy is considered a potential outcome warranting consideration, 
the subsequent birth of a child could be considered unforeseeable. 
But, in an otherwise healthy marriage, the birth of a child is the 
result of consensual sexual intercourse or the use of artificial repro­
ductive technology—conscious decisions made by adults who know 
the potential outcomes of those actions. Thus, unless the opponent 
to a postnuptial agreement can demonstrate that the couple was 
actively seeking to prevent pregnancy or otherwise was under the 
medical impression that the potential for pregnancy was highly un­
likely,75 the birth of a child should not be considered an unforesee­
able circumstance when evaluating the enforceability of a 
postnuptial agreement.76 
74. Id. at 28 (“Unforeseen changes in the relationship, such as having a child, loss 
of employment or moving to another state, may render enforcement of the agreement 
unconscionable.”). 
75. Here, the plaintiff presented no evidence suggesting that the birth of their son 
was not contemplated, and indeed, that point was not advanced by the wife on appeal. 
See generally Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellee, Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17 (No. SC 18568). The 
plaintiff did, however, make that argument to the trial court. See Bedrick v. Bedrick, 
No. FA074007533, 2009 WL 1335100, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2009) (“[T]he 
plaintiff argues that the agreement is unenforceable because the financial circumstances 
of the parties and their assets have changed significantly since the last modification, in 
particular the parties had a child . . . .”).  However, while the court was in agreement 
with the trial court’s conclusion that “[t]he economic circumstances of the parties had 
changed dramatically since the execution of the agreement,” the court also took care to 
mention that the last addendum to the postnuptial agreement was executed before “the 
birth of the parties’ son in 1991.” Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 29 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  In addition to the court’s unusual conclusion that the birth of a child is an 
unforeseeable circumstance to consider in the unconscionability calculus, the court also 
may have neglected to apply its own standard: the language of the parties’ postnuptial 
agreement, by virtue of its reference to “child support,” demonstrates that they actually 
contemplated the possibility of having children.  Brief of the Defendant-Appellant at 
A5, Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17 (No. SC 18568).  Thus, to the extent that the court considered 
the birth of the child an unforeseen circumstance, the court may have been in error. 
76. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court took this position during its review of a 
contested prenuptial agreement: 
[E]veryone who enters a long-term agreement knows that circumstances can 
change during its term, so that what initially appeared desirable might prove 
to be an unfavorable bargain.  Such are the risks that contracting parties rou­
tinely assume. Certainly, the possibilities of illness, birth of children, reliance 
upon a spouse, career change, financial gain or loss, and numerous other events 
that can occur in the course of a marriage cannot be regarded as unforeseeable. 
If parties choose not to address such matters in their prenuptial agreements, 
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69 2012] POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS IN CONNECTICUT 
This is not to say that a child’s well-being should be disre­
garded when evaluating an agreement’s unconscionability at en­
forcement.  The American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of the 
Law of Family Dissolution includes the birth or adoption of a child 
as a factor to consider when evaluating whether enforcement of a 
postnuptial agreement would work a substantial injustice.77  Specifi­
cally, the ALI notes that a couple’s inherent optimism toward mar­
riage may handicap each partner’s ability to accurately anticipate 
marriage outcomes.78  The ALI also notes that because the post-
separation family unit may include children living with one primary 
caregiver an agreement’s financial provisions may have a detrimen­
tal effect on those children.79 
The ALI’s concerns over children are couched, however, in 
terms of identifying agreements subject to scrutiny in the first in­
stance.  Thus, a court does not conduct the substantial-injustice in­
quiry unless the challenger to the agreement shows that, since 
execution, a fixed number of years have passed, a child was born or 
adopted, or that there has been an unforeseeable change of circum­
stances.80  Further, when such a circumstance exists, the challenger 
to the agreement bears the burden of proving that enforcement of 
they must be regarded as having contracted to bear the risk of events that alter 
the value of their bargains. 
Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 166 (Pa. 1990) (emphasis added); cf. Larsen v. 
Scholl, 296 N.W.2d 785, 790 (Iowa 1980) (“[A] direct, foreseeable cause and effect rela­
tionship exists between defendant’s Iowa contacts involving sexual intercourse and the 
resulting child born in Iowa to an Iowa mother.”); McKenna v. Bennett, 558 P.2d 1281, 
1283 (Or. 1977) (“The birth of the child in Oregon for whom the parent would have a 
legal obligation of support is a foreseeable consequence of an act of sexual intercourse 
in Oregon.”). But see Townley v. Townley, No. FA89-0102083 S, 1991 WL 27269, at *1 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 1991) (noting that birth of a child was a “changed circum­
stance[ ] . . . that [was] not contemplated in the [prenuptial] agreement”). 
77. Section 7.05 provides, in relevant part, that 
[a] court should consider whether enforcement of an agreement would work a 
substantial injustice if, and only if, the party resisting its enforcement shows 
that one or more of the following have occurred since the time of the agree­
ment’s execution: . . . (b) a child was born to, or adopted by, the parties, who 
at the time of execution had no children. . . . 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 7.05(2)(b) (2002). 
78. “Even childless parties who anticipate having children are often unable to 
anticipate the impact that children will have on their values and life plans.  Once they 
are parents, the effect of the terms they earlier agreed upon are [sic] therefore likely to 
seem quite different than they expected when childless.” Id. § 7.05 comment b; see also 
id. § 7.05 reporter’s notes on comment b (discussing couples’ over-optimism towards 
marriage outcomes). 
79. Id. § 7.05 comment c. 
80. Id. § 7.05(2). 
31827-w
ne_34-1 S
heet N
o. 39 S
ide B
      05/09/2012   13:22:53
31827-wne_34-1 Sheet No. 39 Side B      05/09/2012   13:22:53
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-1\WNE102.txt unknown Seq: 14  9-MAY-12 10:25
R
70 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:57 
the agreement will cause a substantial injustice.81  Accordingly, the 
ALI’s consideration of whether a child was born after execution is a 
more robust and balanced analysis than the Bedrick court’s exami­
nation, which seems to suggest that the birth of a child may be per 
se unforeseeable.82 
III. THE BEDRICK DILEMMAS 
With its decision in Bedrick, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
joined the majority of states that have concluded, legislatively or 
judicially, that postnuptial agreements are valid and enforceable.83 
In addition, the court also joined the majority of states that have 
applied stricter scrutiny to postnuptial agreements as compared to 
prenuptial agreements.84  What the court did not do, however, was 
clearly explain how the heightened level of scrutiny would be ap­
plied.  Moreover, the court did not decide whether the promise to 
remain married constitutes adequate consideration, how the uncon­
scionability standard is applied, and which party carries the burden. 
This Part searches for answers within and outside of Connecticut. 
A. Continued Marriage as Consideration 
Courts in some states have held that the continuation of the 
marriage, in certain circumstances, is sufficient consideration.  In 
New York, for example, if a marriage is on the verge of collapse, 
the continuation of the marriage itself can be sufficient considera­
tion.85  In Zagari v. Zagari, the parties had clearly been experienc­
ing marital discord; four years into the marriage, the wife left for 
Germany and lived there for four months.86  She subsequently 
moved back to New York but remained out of the marital home for 
another two months.87  Under these facts, the New York Supreme 
Court concluded that “the continuation of the marriage may have 
been very valuable consideration on the part of the wife.”88 
81. Id. § 7.05(3). 
82. Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 28 (Conn. 2011). 
83. See Williams, supra note 11, at 881. 
84. Id. 
85. See, e.g., Zagari v. Zagari, 746 N.Y.S.2d 235, 238 (Sup. Ct. 2002); cf. 45 N.Y. 
JURISPRUDENCE 2D, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 168 (2007) (“When required, courts have 
generally held that the marriage itself may be sufficient consideration for an antenuptial 
or prenuptial agreement.”). 
86. Zagari, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 236. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 238 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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71 2012] POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS IN CONNECTICUT 
In contrast, in Whitmore v. Whitmore, the Appellate Division 
held that the continuation of the marriage was not sufficient consid­
eration.89  There, the spouses had signed their postnuptial agree­
ment three months after their marriage.90  The court rejected the 
husband’s contention that the continuation of the marriage was ad­
equate consideration and concluded that, in the absence of any 
other promises or releases by the husband, the postnuptial agree­
ment was unenforceable for lack of consideration.91  Although the 
court did not explain why the continuation of the marriage was in­
adequate, the court restricted its conclusion to “the circumstances 
of this case,” which presumably referred to the absence of marital 
discord.92 
Some states have recognized the continuation of the marriage, 
or the promise not to divorce, as adequate consideration without a 
prerequisite of marital discord. For example, in In re Marriage of 
Tabassum and Younis, the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that 
“[f]orbearance of bringing or prosecuting a divorce action has been 
directly recognized as consideration in other states, and we find no 
compelling reason to deviate from these authorities.”93  Other 
states accept the promise not to divorce, coupled with marital dis­
cord, as adequate consideration in the context of reconciliation 
agreements.94  Note that the requirement of some degree of marital 
discord is consistent with the principle that “past consideration can­
not support a current promise.”95  Moreover, the promise to recon­
89. Whitmore v. Whitmore, 778 N.Y.S.2d 73, 75 (App. Div. 2004). 
90. Id. at 74. 
91. Id. at 75. 
92. Id.  The court also cited Zagari, which involved not only clear allegations of 
marital discord but also the execution of a postnuptial contract over four years into the 
marriage. Zagari, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 238. Contra Whitmore, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 74 (noting 
three months between marriage and contract execution). 
93. In re Marriage of Tabassum & Younis, 881 N.E.2d 396, 407 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2007). 
94. See Flansburg v. Flansburg, 581 N.E.2d 430, 434 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) 
(“[E]xtension of a marriage that would have otherwise been dissolved but for the exe­
cution of an agreement to reconcile has been deemed adequate consideration.”); Pacelli 
v. Pacelli, 725 A.2d 56, 59 (N.J. App. Div. 1999) (“A prerequisite to enforcement [of a 
reconciliation agreement] is a requirement that ‘the marital relationship has deterio­
rated at least to the brink of an indefinite separation or a suit for divorce.’” (quoting 
Nicholson v. Nicholson, 489 A.2d 1247, 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985))); Bratton 
v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 603 (Tenn. 2004) (noting that “this was not a reconciliation 
agreement where separation or divorce was imminent, making the wife’s promise to 
remain in the marriage a meaningful act”). 
95. Id. at 600; see also Simmons v. Simmons, 249 S.W.3d 843, 846-47 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 2007). 
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72 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:57 
cile and continue the marriage must be genuine and made in good 
faith, i.e., it must not be illusory.96  Finally, some states have 
avoided the issue by simply eliminating consideration as a require­
ment for enforcement of a postnuptial agreement.97 
The Bedrick court made clear that consideration is a required 
element of a valid postnuptial agreement. The only open question 
remaining is what will constitute adequate consideration.  Under 
Bedrick’s heightened scrutiny, the likely answer is that promises to 
remain in the marriage or not to divorce will cause an agreement to 
fail for lack of consideration.  Attorneys drafting postnuptial agree­
ments should draft accordingly and consider mutual waiver provi­
sions that release some right to or interest in the other spouse’s 
property, such as a release of alimony or a claim to the other 
spouse’s property at death.98 
Notwithstanding the court’s clear position on this issue, there 
remains the question of whether the requirement of consideration 
actually protects against the “greater potential for one spouse to 
take advantage of the other.”99  Consideration does not need to be 
substantial,100 and parties can likely supply adequate consideration 
through nominal transfers of separate property.101  Thus, “a crafty 
lawyer can draft a valid postnuptial agreement without ever ad­
dressing the court’s core concern: the potentially ‘unjust advantage’ 
that one spouse may have in the negotiation process.”102 
B. Unconscionable at the Time of Enforcement 
1. Connecticut 
Bedrick provides an initial glimpse into what circumstances 
might lead a court to conclude that enforcement of an agreement 
96. See Fogg v. Fogg, 567 N.E.2d 921, 923 (Mass. 1991) (holding unenforceable a 
postnuptial agreement where the agreement “was signed as a result of the wife’s im­
plied fraudulent promise that she would attempt to preserve the marriage”); Marshall v. 
Marshall, 273 S.E.2d 360, 363 (W. Va. 1980) (noting that the husband’s promise not to 
divorce was inadequate consideration where he filed for divorce after receiving benefit 
of the postnuptial agreement). 
97. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-2-302(1), -303 (2005); WIS. STAT. § 766.58 
(2001); Laudig v. Laudig, 624 A.2d 651, 654-55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); see also PRINCI­
PLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.01 
(4) (2002). 
98. Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 27 n.5 (Conn. 2011); Bratton, 136 S.W.3d at 
604 n.2. 
99. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 27. 
100. Ravdin, supra note 11, at § I(K)(4), A-41 (2003). 
101. Williams, supra note 11, at 841. 
102. Id. 
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73 2012] POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS IN CONNECTICUT 
would be unconscionable.  That said, the court’s analysis was brief 
and, based on its conclusion that the question of “uncon­
scionab[ility] is analogous to determining whether enforcement of 
an agreement would work an injustice,”103 potentially creates some 
tension with previous decisions that have considered whether the 
enforcement of a prenuptial agreement would work an injustice. 
Although the court did not apply the existing case law on prenup­
tial agreements to the facts of Bedrick, those decisions provide in­
struction on what factual findings might lead a court to conclude 
that enforcement of an agreement would be unconscionable. 
In Crews v. Crews, the Connecticut Supreme Court, in addition 
to emphasizing the challenger’s “heavy burden”104 when challeng­
ing the validity of a prenuptial agreement, also addressed for the 
first time the analysis required under the third prong of McHugh:105 
To render unenforceable an otherwise valid ante-nuptial agree­
ment, a court must determine: (1) the parties’ intent and circum­
stances when they signed the antenuptial agreement; (2) the 
circumstances of the parties at the time of the dissolution of the 
marriage; (3) whether those circumstances are “so far beyond” 
the contemplation of the parties at the time of execution; and (4) 
if the circumstances are beyond the parties’ initial contemplation, 
whether enforcement would cause an injustice.106 
On review, the court agreed with the defendant “that there [was] 
insufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate that the change 
in the circumstances between the parties at the time of dissolution 
was not contemplated.”107  The facts were as follows. After a six­
teen year marriage, the wife had filed for divorce.  At the time of 
trial, she had an annual net income of $69,056, and her husband, 
$98,540.108  The husband owned the marital home along with invest­
ment and retirement assets, while the wife owned a business valued 
at $96,000.109  Through the prenuptial agreement, the wife had 
103. Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 28. 
104. Crews v. Crews, 989 A.2d 1060, 1069 (Conn. 2010). 
105. The wife had challenged the validity of the prenuptial agreement based on 
the injustice that would result from its enforcement, an argument that implicated Mc­
Hugh’s third prong.  McHugh v. McHugh, 436 A.2d 8, 11 (Conn. 1980). The Crews 
prenuptial agreement had been executed in 1988 and thus was subject to the McHugh 
common law test. Crews, 989 A.2d at 1063. 
106. Crews, 989 A.2d at 1069. 
107. Id. at 1067. 
108. Id. at 1062-63. 
109. Id. 
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74 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:57 
waived her right to, inter alia, alimony and any share in the hus­
band’s assets or marital home.110 
The court faulted the wife, who had challenged the prenuptial 
agreement, for her failure to establish that there was a dramatic, 
unforeseeable change in circumstances between the time of execu­
tion and the time of dissolution.111  Although the trial court had 
concluded that during that interval, “the parties’ financial circum­
stances had changed dramatically,”112 the court determined that the 
financial circumstances at divorce were foreseeable and consistent 
with what was contemplated at the time they executed the prenup­
tial agreement.113  In fact, the court found that the prenuptial agree­
ment itself provided evidence of the parties’ intentions and 
expectations, and militated against a finding that enforcement 
would work an injustice.114 
Similarly, in Winchester v. McCue, the Connecticut Appellate 
Court upheld the enforcement of a prenuptial agreement that the 
wife had challenged as unconscionable under the third prong of Mc­
Hugh.115  There, the husband’s financial assets had increased sub­
stantially116 but, according to the court, not so much as to warrant a 
finding that enforcement of the agreement would be unconsciona­
ble.117  Similar to Crews, the court emphasized that the wife had 
failed to demonstrate that the changed financial circumstances were 
extraordinary and unforeseeable, stating “that the threshold for 
finding such a dramatic change is high.”118 
Given this precedent, it is unclear why the Bedrick court de­
clined to evaluate the circumstances of the parties pursuant to the 
unconscionability test set forth in Crews.  Notwithstanding the obvi­
ous distinction between Crews and Bedrick—namely, the review of 
a prenuptial agreement in the former and a postnuptial in the lat­
ter—the underlying question of whether enforcement of the agree­
110. Id. at 1063. 
111. Id. at 1069. 
112. Id. at 1068 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
113. Id. at 1070. 
114. Id. at 1070-71. 
115. Winchester v. McCue, 882 A.2d 143, 148-49 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005). 
116. The wife had alleged that the husband’s financial assets had increased by 
430%. Id. at 149.  In addition, she argued that the trial court should have considered 
the husband’s pension, which he valued at $200,000, as asset of his estate. Id. at 149 n.4. 
The court concluded, however, that even including the husband’s pension in his estate 
“would not have increased [the estate] to the dramatic degree contemplated in the third 
prong of McHugh.” Id. 
117. Id. at 149. 
118. Id. 
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ment would work an injustice is the same in both cases.119 
Accordingly, the Bedrick court may have missed an opportunity to 
create a consistent body of law in the arena of pre- and postnuptial 
agreements.  Nevertheless, a subsequent determination on the allo­
cation of the burden may resolve this tension. 
2.	 Guidance from Other Jurisdictions Evaluating
 
Agreements at Enforcement
 
In Massachusetts, a disproportionate distribution of assets 
alone will not invalidate a postnuptial agreement, even under the 
agreement-hostile fair and reasonable standard.  In Ansin v. Cra­
ven-Ansin, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently held 
that postnuptial agreements were valid and enforceable, and con­
cluded that among the requirements for enforcement was the re­
quirement that the terms at the time of dissolution must be fair and 
reasonable to be enforceable.120  The postnuptial agreement in An-
sin provided that the wife disclaimed any interest in the husband’s 
separately held real estate and would receive, inter alia, $5 million 
from the husband in the event of divorce.121  The court rejected the 
wife’s argument that she was receiving “a disproportionately small 
percentage of the couple’s marital assets” and affirmed the lower 
court’s decision that the agreement was fair and reasonable.122  In 
so doing, the court noted that “[t]he wife points to no material 
change between the time she, on the advice of counsel, executed 
the marital agreement and the husband’s petition for divorce in 
2006.”123 
Decisions evaluating conscionability and fairness in the context 
of prenuptial agreements are particularly instructive.  In Blue v. 
Blue, the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in reviewing the terms of a 
prenuptial agreement at the time of enforcement “to ensure that 
119. Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 29 (Conn. 2011) (reviewing “question of 
unconscionability”); Crews, 989 A.2d at 1064 n.2 (reviewing question of whether en­
forcement of prenuptial agreement would work an injustice).  In both Crews and 
Bedrick, the courts made clear that the question of “[w]hether enforcement of an agree­
ment would work an injustice is analogous to determining whether enforcement of an 
agreement would be unconscionable.” Id. at 1066; see also Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 29 
(“Thus, the trial court’s finding that enforcement of the postnuptial agreement would 
work an injustice was tantamount to a finding that the agreement was unconscionable 
at the time the defendant sought to enforce it.”). 
120. Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 929 N.E.2d 955, 961, 963-64 (Mass. 2010). 
121. Id. at 960-61. 
122. Id. at 969. 
123. Id. 
31827-w
ne_34-1 S
heet N
o. 42 S
ide B
      05/09/2012   13:22:53
31827-wne_34-1 Sheet No. 42 Side B      05/09/2012   13:22:53
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-1\WNE102.txt unknown Seq: 20  9-MAY-12 10:25
76 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:57 
facts and circumstances have not changed since the agreement was 
executed to such an extent as to render its enforcement unconscion­
able,” upheld the agreement as not unconscionable.124  The court 
noted that “the parties’ financial situations were already disparate 
when they entered into the agreement” and that the challenger 
needed to do more than establish that the proponent had improved 
his position financially: “She must also show that her position has 
suffered in a manner which was beyond the contemplation of the 
parties when they signed the agreement.  In the alternative, [the 
challenger] must establish that the agreement is oppressive or mani­
festly unfair to her at the time of dissolution.”125 
In Gant v. Gant, the West Virginia Supreme Court noted that 
courts reviewing the terms of an agreement at the time of enforce­
ment are primarily examining the foreseeability of the parties’ cir­
cumstances at that time.126  The court also noted the likelihood that 
the parties were not on equal financial footing at the outset: 
[W]e are loath to apply a vague and entirely subjective standard 
of “fairness.”  Throughout all of contract law there is the recur­
ring problem of disparity of bargaining power; thus if mere dispa­
rate bargaining power alone is grounds for invalidating contracts, 
contracts between rich and poor or between strong and weak will 
always be of questionable validity.  Such, however, is not the rule 
elsewhere in contract law, and we see no policy reasons to make 
it so in the law of prenuptial agreements. 
The term “fair,” without some further elaboration, gives no 
guidance whatsoever concerning which agreements will be bind­
ing and which agreements will be struck down.  Furthermore, 
candor compels us to raise to a conscious level the fact that, as in 
this case, prenuptial agreements will almost always be entered 
into between people with property or an income potential to pro­
tect on one side and people who are impecunious on the other. 
Measuring an agreement by an undefined judicial standard of 
fairness is an invitation to the very wealth redistribution that 
these agreements are designed to prevent.127 
These cases stand for the proposition that parties to prenuptial 
and postnuptial agreements, while maybe in confidential relation­
ships to each other, should be afforded the freedom to contract, 
124. Blue v. Blue, 60 S.W.3d 585, 589, 591 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001). 
125. Id. at 590-91. 
126. Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 114-15 (W. Va. 1985), overruled on other 
grounds by Ware v. Ware, 687 S.E.2d 382, 390-91 (W. Va. 2009). 
127. Id. at 114. 
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regardless of the financial detriment to one of the bargaining par­
ties.  Moreover, any disparity in bargaining power that exists may 
not only be similar to that seen in standard business contracts, and 
thus should be subject to similar treatment, but also will be miti­
gated by the advice of independent counsel.  Accordingly, judicial 
review of the terms of a postnuptial agreement at the time of en­
forcement should be skeptical of claims of unconscionability, espe­
cially when all procedural standards have been met. 
Indeed, this approach is embodied by the standard in Crews v. 
Crews, and thus should be adopted for postnuptial agreements. 
The court in Bedrick, though it struck down the postnuptial agree­
ment because enforcement would have caused an injustice, stopped 
short of announcing a true standard of unconscionability at the time 
of dissolution.  Without creating tension with Bedrick, then, future 
cases can adopt and apply the Crews standard. 
C. Whose Burden is it Anyway? 
With respect to prenuptial agreements, Connecticut’s position 
is clear for both common law and statutory review: the challenger 
bears the burden of establishing the agreement’s invalidity.128 
However, the Bedrick court did not indicate who would bear that 
burden of establishing a postnuptial agreement’s validity or 
invalidity. 
Many jurisdictions place the burden on the proponent of the 
postnuptial agreement.  In Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, the Massachu­
setts Supreme Judicial Court definitively held that, “[w]here one 
spouse challenges the enforceability of the agreement, the spouse 
seeking to enforce the agreement shall bear the burden of satisfying 
these criteria.”129  Arizona has done the same.130  In California, the 
courts have more narrowly placed that burden on the party who 
gained the advantage from the postnuptial agreement, but only af­
ter the court determines that the agreement was unfair.131  The ALI 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution does not provide for a 
fairness review of a postnuptial agreement’s terms at the time of 
execution, but it does provide for a review of the procedural re­
128. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36g(a) (2011); Crews v. Crews, 989 A.2d 1060, 1069 
(Conn. 2010). 
129. Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 929 N.E.2d 955, 964 (Mass. 2010). 
130. In re Estate of Harber, 449 P.2d 7, 16 (Ariz. 1969). 
131. See In re Marriage of Burkle, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 181, 197, 201-02 (Ct. App. 
2006); McCourt v. McCourt, No. BD514309, 2010 WL 5092780, slip op. at 44-45 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2010). 
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quirements at that time, placing the burden on the proponent of the 
agreement.132 
Other jurisdictions place the burden on the challenger.  By 
statute in Colorado, “the party against whom enforcement is 
sought” must prove the invalidity of the postnuptial agreement.133 
Indeed, pre- and postnuptial agreements in Colorado are treated 
identically.134  Texas and Wisconsin take the same legislative ap­
proach.135  Additionally, in contrast to its position relative to proce­
dural requirements, the ALI Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution places the burden on the challenger to establish that 
enforcement of the agreement would work a substantial injustice.136 
Connecticut may consider a hybrid, burden-shifting approach, 
similar to the ALI’s approach, which would be consistent with its 
requirement of heightened scrutiny of postnuptial agreements. 
Pursuant to that heightened scrutiny and Bedrick’s application of 
the fair and reasonable standard at the time of execution, the pro­
ponent of the postnuptial agreement could be required to establish 
that, at the time of execution, the terms were fair and reasonable, 
full disclosure was made, and the parties entered into the agree­
ment knowingly and voluntarily, “without any undue influence, 
fraud, coercion, duress or similar defect.”137  If the proponent suc­
cessfully established that the terms of the agreement were fair and 
reasonable, then the burden would shift to the challenger to show 
that enforcement of the agreement would cause an injustice.  Here 
the application of the Crews test for unconscionability would be the 
logical solution and would help create a consistent body of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Knowing the contours of Bedrick v. Bedrick is only half the 
battle.  Clearly, those attorneys drafting postnuptial agreements 
need to take extra care to ensure that the requirements identified in 
Bedrick are properly addressed.  Drafters should assume, however, 
that their clients will one day be required to prove the validity of 
132. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOM­
MENDATIONS § 7.04 (2002). 
133. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-307 (West 2005). 
134. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-302. 
135. TEX. FAM. CODE  ANN. § 4.105 (West 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.88(6) 
(West 2009); Nesmith v. Berger, 64 S.W.3d 110, 114-15 (Tex. App. Ct. 2001). 
136. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOM­
MENDATIONS § 7.05 (2002). 
137. Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 27 (Conn. 2011). 
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the agreement, rather than merely defend against it.  Accordingly, 
in addition to drafting a substantively fair agreement and executing 
the agreement without any procedural defects that could be fatal if 
later challenged, that agreement should incorporate provisions that 
reflect the couple’s contemplation of potential future events. To 
guard against claims of inadequate consideration, each spouse 
should waive some interest to which he or she would be entitled in 
the event of divorce or death, such as alimony or estate distribu­
tions.  Finally, the agreement should be revisited periodically and 
reaffirmed, minimizing challenges to the terms of the agreement at 
the time of dissolution.  These steps, with careful and competent 
drafting, will help guard any postnuptial agreement against later 
challenges. 
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APPENDIX138 
Bruce Bedrick, in his brief to the Connecticut Supreme Court, 
submitted the various postnuptial agreements and addendums 
signed by him and his wife. Those agreements are reproduced in 
this Appendix just as they appeared in the Defendant-Appellant’s 
brief, with the exception of the bracketed text. 
[Initial Agreement]139 
THIS AGREEMENT made by and between DEBORAH E. 
BEDRICK, a resident of the Town of Stafford Springs, County 
of Tolland and State of Connecticut (hereinafter called 
“Deborah”) and BRUCE BEDRICK, a resident of the Town of 
Stafford Springs, County of Tolland and State of Connecticut, 
(hereinafter called “Bruce”); 
W I T N E S S E T H  : 
The parties hereto are married to each other. Each is pos­
sessed of property of value.  This Agreement is executed by the 
parties for the purpose of fixing and defining their several prop­
erty rights as between themselves. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual 
promises and undertakings hereinafter set forth, the parties agree 
as follows: 
1. Each party shall, during his or her lifetime, keep and re­
tain sole ownership, control and enjoyment of all property, real 
or personal, now owned or hereafter acquired by him or her, free 
and clear of any claim by the other. 
2. Bruce, for himself, his heirs, executors, administrators and 
assigns, forever releases, waives and relinquishes all rights, claims 
or interest which he otherwise might have upon the death of 
Deborah subsequent to her marriage to him in or to her estate 
under any statute of succession or any other law now or hereafter 
adopted, expressly including but not limited to giving Bruce any 
rights of homestead, dower, curtesy, right of election to take 
against the Will, or other interest or rights in or to the estate or 
any part or asset of the estate of Deborah, or any right to receive 
any family allowance or any other allowance for maintenance or 
support from said estate, and Bruce forever waives all right to act 
as administrator or an administrator with Will annexed of the es­
tate of Deborah. 
138. Brief of the Defendant-Appellant at A1-A9, Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17 
(Conn. 2010) (No. SC 18568). 
139. The text below, and the eleven numbered paragraphs that follow, were 
typewritten. 
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3. Deborah, for herself, her heirs, executors, administrators 
and assigns, forever releases, waives and relinquishes all rights, 
claims or interest which she otherwise might have upon the death 
of Bruce subsequent to her marriage to him in or to his estate 
under any statute of succession or any other law now or hereafter 
adopted, expressly including but not limited to giving Deborah 
any rights of homestead, dower, curtesy, right of election to take 
against the Will, or other interest or right in or to the estate or 
any part of asset of the estate of Bruce or any right to receive any 
family allowance for maintenance or support from said estate, 
and Deborah forever waives all rights to act as administrator or 
an administrator with Will annexed to the estate of Bruce, or to 
any allowance for support or alimony in the event of a divorce or 
dissolution of marriage. 
4. This agreement shall become effective immediately upon 
execution by the parties hereto. 
5. Each party shall, upon the other’s request, take any and 
all steps to execute, acknowledge and deliver to the other party 
any and all further instruments necessary or expedient to effectu­
ate the purpose and intent of this agreement. 
6. Deborah and Bruce hereby acknowledge to the other that 
each has fully acquainted the other with their respective means 
and resources; and that each has informed the other that each 
respectfully has income; that each of them has ascertained and 
weighed all the facts, conditions and circumstances likely to influ­
ence their judgment herein; that all matters embodied herein as 
well as all questions pertaining thereto have been fully and satis­
factorily explained to them; that they understand and consent to 
all of the provisions hereof; and that they are entering into this 
agreement freely and voluntarily and with full knowledge. 
7. This agreement shall in no way restrict either or both of 
the parties from holding property as joint tenants, with or with­
out rights of survivorship or as tenants by the entireties, and shall 
in no way restrict either from providing for the other by way of 
gift or bequest. 
8. Each party was advised by their respective attorneys as to 
their legal rights and this agreement is being executed in accor­
dance therewith. 
9. This agreement contains the entire understanding of the 
parties.  There are no representations, warranties, promises, cov­
enants or undertakings, oral or otherwise, other than those ex­
pressly set forth herein. 
10. This agreement shall inure to the benefit of and shall be 
binding upon the heirs, executors and administrators of the 
parties. 
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11. If any one or more of the agreements herein contained 
are held by the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdic­
tion to be unlawful, void or unenforceable for any reason whatso­
ever, every other agreement contained in this agreement shall 
nevertheless remain valid, subsisting and effective. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have here­
unto set their hands and seals this 10th day of December, 1977. 
[Signed Deborah Bedrick; Bruce Bedrick] 
The following is a settlement agreement between Deborah 
and Bruce Bedrick.140 
1. In the event of dissolution of the marriage, Deborah will 
be allowed to stay in the primary home, if there is one, for a 
period of not more than six months.  During that time, she will 
pay half the rent or mortgage, and all the utilities. 
2. In the event of dissolution of the marriage, Deborah will 
remain an employee of Mr. Auto Wash for a period of not more 
than six months. 
3. In the event of dissolution of the marriage, Deborah will 
be entitled to a cash settlement. The amount of this settlement 
will be reviewed from time to time. 
4. In the event that dissolution of the marriage is caused by 
infidelity on the part of Deborah, there will be no cash settle­
ment.  Infidelity by Bruce will result in a doubling of the cash 
settlement. 
5. The marriage may be dissolved at any time for any reason 
at no fault to either party, providing there is no infidelity. 
6. This document will be reviewed from time to time, and 
pertinent additions to it may be made at these times. 
[Signed Deborah Bedrick; Bruce Bedrick] 
[Untitled Paragraph]141 
In the case of separation or divorce, it is our desire to be 
independent of each other.  As a result, neither Deb nor Bruce 
will be responsible to pay any alimony or other monies outside 
the settlement and child support agreed upon in this document. 
[Signed Deborah Bedrick; Bruce Bedrick] 
* * * 
140. This text, and the following six numbered paragraphs, was handwritten. This 
text appeared directly below the typed portion reproduced above. 
141. This paragraph was handwritten and undated. 
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[First Addendum]142 
ADDENDUM TO AGREEMENT OF 12/10/77 
Dissolution of marriage will result in a cash settlement to 
Deborah of $20,000.  It will also relieve her of any joint liabilities, 
specifically the mortgage on 23 Bay Road, East Hampton, CT.
 
She also waives any rights to any financial asset from this house.
 
[Dated: 5/1/80; signed: Deborah Bedrick, Bruce Bedrick]
 
* * *
 
[Second Addendum]
 
ADDENDUM TO AGREEMENT OF 12/10/77 
Cash settlement as noted in 1980 will increase to $40,000. 
Deborah is also, upon receiving settlement, relieved of any liabil­
ity for mortgages on house and waives any claim to these assets. 
[Dated: 5/15/83; signed: Deborah Bedrick, Bruce Bedrick] 
* * * 
[Third Addendum] 
ADDENDUM TO AGREEMENT OF 12/10/77 
Money in individual IRA accounts shall remain, and not be 
affected by dissolution of the marriage. 
[Dated: 5/10/84; signed: Deborah Bedrick, Bruce Bedrick] 
* * * 
[Fourth Addendum] 
ADDENDUM TO AGREEMENT OF 12/10/77 
1. Cash settlement increased to $55,000.  All other prior con­
ditions remain. 
2. The companies Mr. Auto Wash and related companies be­
long solely to Bruce.  Deborah waives any claim to any assets of 
any of these companies. 
[Dated: 5/20/86; signed: Deborah Bedrick, Bruce Bedrick]
 
* * *
 
[Fifth Addendum]
 
ADDENDUM TO AGREEMENT OF 12/10/77 
1. Cash settlement is increased to $75,000.  Half the amount 
is payable when Deborah leaves the primary home. The second 
half is payable within 12 months of the first payment. 
2. In addition to prior conditions, Deborah is relieved of any 
liability for loans made by Bruce Bedrick or Bruce Bedrick En­
142. This addendum was handwritten, as were all that follow. 
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terprises for business purposes, specifically the mortgage at 650 
New Park Ave., West Hartford, CT.  She also waives any claim to 
the assets of this property. 
[Dated: 5/18/89; signed: Deborah Bedrick, Bruce Bedrick]
 
* * *
 
[Untitled text]143
 
It is my desire that if I die before Bruce, while married, that 
all my assets go to him, and that our children remain with him. 
Secondly, it is my desire that if we should die simultane­
ously, that Bonnie Bauer will accept custody of our children until 
they are 21 years of age.  I desire that my assets are put into a 
trust for the children’s care and education.  I would prefer that 
Bonnie execute this trust, under the supervision of M. Jackson 
Webber to ensure that the trust is used solely for this purpose. 
My assets at the time of my death will be formulated using 
the separation agreement formula. 
143. This text may have been Deborah Bedrick’s attempt at a will. 
